The human spy, in terms of the American espionage effort, had never been terribly pertinent.

I found that our Soviet espionage efforts had virtually never, or had very seldom, produced any worthwhile political or economic intelligence on the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union did not achieve victory over the West, so was my information inadequate to help them to victory, or did it play no particular role in their failure to achieve victory?

The FBI, to its credit in a self-serving sort of way, rejects the routine use of the polygraph on its own people.

I knew quite well, when I gave the names of our agents in the Soviet Union, that I was exposing them to the full machinery of counterespionage and the law, and then prosecution and capital punishment.

My little scam in April '85 went like this: Give me $50,000; here's some names of some people we've recruited.

By the late '70s I had come to question the point of a great deal of what we were doing, in terms of the CIA's overall charter.