The relation of the law to the self is only a helpful way of thinking about the law, that helps us better understand its validity for us.

When consequentialist theories are developed in terms of an equally shallow psychology of the good - such as a crude form of hedonism - the results can sometimes strike sensible people as revolting and inhuman. People can be reduced to simple repositories of positive or negative sensory states, and their humanity is lost sight of entirely.

I think Fichte did take it further than Kant by arguing that we can regard the moral law as objectively valid only by seeing it as addressed to us by another being, even though Fichte thought God could not literally be a person who could address us.

Empiricist philosophy always tends to be anti-philosophy (and is often proud of it).

Kant's aim was to develop a religion within the boundaries of mere reason (that is, reason unaided by special empirical revelation) and then to ask about existing ecclesiastical faith (especially about Christianity, and the Lutheran Christianity of his time and place) how this revealed faith must be interpreted if it is to be reconciled with reason, and even seen as a wider (though morally optional) extension of a religion of reason.

Kant was a rational theologian. He did not pretend to be a biblical or revealed theologian.

Reason necessarily expresses itself through emotions and emotions are healthy only insofar as they are expressions of reason.