It's the concept of having a computer voting machine that bothers me, more so than the specific poor implementation that we have from Diebold.

What we did is important because we proved that virtually all of the wireless networks used by companies and hospitals are completely open and offer no protection for the data on them.

In any election, it's important that the public perceives that the election is held fairly.

I've been saying all along that my biggest fear is that someone would program a machine to give a wrong answer. If that were to happen, the machine would still work fine - we just wouldn't know it.

My position hasn't changed over the years. Which is that online voting is a very unsafe idea and a very bad idea and something I think no technological breakthrough I can foresee can ever change.

People's computers are not getting more secure. They're getting more infected with viruses. They're getting more under the control of malware.

Many of the touted advantages of electronic voting can still be achieved with paper ballots if you use a computerized ballot marking scheme.