We have been trying to point out that this concept of an indefinitely favorable future is dangerous, even if it is true; because even if it is true you can easily overvalue the security, since you make it worth anything you want it to be worth. Beyond this, it is particularly dangerous too, because sometimes your ideas of the future turn out to be wrong. Then you have paid an awful lot for a future that isn't there. Your position then is pretty bad.

Thousands of people have tried, and the evidence is clear: The more you trade, the less you keep.

Buy when most people, including experts, are pessimistic, and sell when they are actively optimistic.

Since we have emphasized that analysis will lead to a positive conclusion only in the exceptional case, it follows that many securities must be examined before one is found that has real possibilities for the analyst. By what practical means does he proceed to make his discoveries? Mainly by hard and systematic work.

An intelligent investor gets satisfaction from the thought that his operations are exactly opposite to those of the crowd.

The most striking thing about Graham's discussion of how to allocate your assets between stocks and bonds is that he never mentions the word "age".

There is a close logical connection between the concept of a safety margin and the principle of diversification.