Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.

To discover how much of our resources must be mobilized for war, we must first examine our political aim and that of the enemy. We must gauge the strength and situation of the opposite state. We must gauge the character and abilities of its government and people and do the same in regard to our own. Finally, we must evaluate the political sympathies of other states and the effect the war may have on them.

War is regarded as nothing but the continuation of state policy with other means.

The only situation a commander can know fully is his own: his opponent's he can know only from unreliable intelligence.

The more a leader is in the habit of demanding from his men, the surer he will be that his demands will be answered.

However much pains may be taken to combine the soldier and the citizen in one and the same individual, whatever may be done to nationalize wars, never will it be possible to do away with the professionalism of the business; and if that cannot be done, then those who belong to it will always look upon themselves as a kind of guild, in the regulations, laws, and customs in which the "Spirit of War" finds its expression. It would be very wrong to look down upon this corporate spirit, or esprit de corps, which may and should exist more or less in every Army.

Although our intellect always longs for clarity and certainty, our nature often finds uncertainty fascinating.