Leonid Brezhnev did not understand the enormous political importance of the decision to produce and afterwards deploy the SS-20s.

Some of the American military obviously were thinking in terms of fighting a nuclear war. I was opposed to that.

I have talked about the deterioration of the atmosphere between Washington and Moscow. It was quite clear that in the year 1980, which at the same time was an election year in America, these negotiations would not go very far, but immediately after the start of the Reagan administration we in Bonn started to try influencing them on the medium-range nuclear weapons negotiations, and we told them that in our view the best outcome would be zero-zero, zero on either side.

President [Ronald] Reagan never has tried to become an expert on military matters. He never has endeavored to learn the most important details in that field, which lead to a situation in which his aides played a much greater roles than aides would have played under President Ford or let us say in the whole Nixon-Ford-Kissinger era.

Admirals and Generals always want more ships and more weapons and they take the arguments where they can find them.

People who have visions should go see a doctor.

Leonid Brezhnev did not understand the enormous political importance of the decision to produce and afterwards deploy the SS-20s.