Our problem was that in the American approach to Soviet affairs policy has oscillated between people who take an essentially psychological approach and people who take an essentially theological approach, and the two really meet. The psychologists try to "understand" the Soviet Union. And try to ease its alleged fears. The theologians say the Soviets are evil.

Committees are consumers and sometimes sterilizers of ideas, rarely creators of them.

The Russian empire under czars and commissars has been hard to deal with for other countries.

Most foreign policies that history has marked highly, in whatever country, have been originated by leaders who were opposed by experts.

I believe it is a mistake to isolate arms control from other areas of policy.

Historically when there is a rising power like China, it has usually led to confrontations between the rising power and the existing dominant powers. And when you have a shift of the center of gravity of world affairs from the Atlantic to the Pacific, then you have an additional element.

The superpowers often behave like two heavily armed blind men feeling their way around a room, each believing himself in mortal peril from the other, whom he assumes to have perfect vision.