The United States wanted to send its trained rebel groups to Syria to fight ISIS. Out of twenty-five hundred rebels they had trained, only seventy accepted to go to Syria to fight ISIS. Everybody else wanted to go to Syria to fight the government. So you've got to wake up and smell the coffee. . . . The rebel groups have not fired a shot against ISIS.

If anything caused ISIS, it was the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.

I think the most important challenge that remains is this mentality in Washington that sanctions have been an asset, and some people want to find even an excuse to keep them or an excuse to reintroduce them. I don't know whether they've looked at the record of how sanctions actually produce exactly the opposite of what they wanted to produce.

So there are two separate tracks. One track is for the Syrian government and the opposition that is interested in a peaceful future of Syria to come together for national unity, for the political process. At the same time, it is a requirement for everybody to stop supporting the extremist groups, to stop allowing them safe passage, to stop allowing them to receive weapons, to stop allowing them to receive financial assistance, and to come together in actually fighting them.

You cannot have security at the expense of the insecurity of others.

We're [Iran] not dismantling anything. We are uninstalling some centrifuges and reconstructing the Arak reactor, modernizing it. . . . The remaining activities that we need undertake will not take more than several days, less than two weeks.

Iran's military hardware is less than a fraction of that of any of the countries in this region.