Suppression of impulses that would put you in danger is obviously an important neurobiological function.

The neuroscience of consciousness is not going to stop in its tracks because some philosophers guesses that project cannot be productive.

Studies of decision-making in the monkey, where activity of single neurons in parietal cortex is recorded, you can see a lot about the time-accuracy trade-off in the monkey's decision, and you can see from the neuron's activity at what point in his accumulation of evidence he makes his decision to make a particular movement.

Brains are not magical; they are causal machines.

When that theory is isolated from known facts, it is likely not to be productive.

When philosophers try to understand consciousness, much of what they claim is not conceptual analysis at all, though it may be shopped under that description.

In all probability, mental states are processes and activities of the brain. Exactly what activities, and exactly at what level of description, remains to be seen.