nd the reason is is if you put a backdoor in, hackers can presumably get a hold of that backdoor as well and break it open. So you make systems less secure for everyone if you do that.

So end-to-end encryption, keeps things encrypted and that means that law enforcement, without a warrant, cannot read that information.

My beliefs really haven't changed since I was in government. If anything, it gave me appreciation for how challenging it is for the government to balance and play the roles that it needs to, both wanting to keep the nation secure, both having the rights to collect extensive intelligence overseas, less so within the country.

Now, with a warrant, they can always go to the information service provider and attempt to get that information. But even then, they may not be able to because the party selling the encryption services may be a third party and may not even know who the parties are that are communicating.

We're not all on the same page here. So most of us in the technology community are opposed to what we call backdoors that would allow law enforcement to tap in.

You know, yes, you can always argue that a backdoor can be built that's more secure, you know, and more difficult to get to and only law enforcement's going to get there. But nobody in the field of security believes that's ultimately going to provide this same protection that a tight end-to-end solution has without a backdoor.

Look, if I were running the FBI, you know, I probably would want to have backdoors as well, so I'm sympathetic to the director's view. But there is risk if you put that backdoor in. There's no question you enhance the risk, number one. Number two, there are the privacy implications that are of concern to parties.