I said in court a long time ago that I didn't see that the Soviet Union was significantly helped by the information I gave them, nor that the United States was significantly harmed.

No one's interested really in knowing what policies or diplomatic initiatives or arms negotiations might have been compromised by me.

By the late '70s I had come to question the point of a great deal of what we were doing, in terms of the CIA's overall charter.

I found that our Soviet espionage efforts had virtually never, or had very seldom, produced any worthwhile political or economic intelligence on the Soviet Union.

My little scam in April '85 went like this: Give me $50,000; here's some names of some people we've recruited.

The only thing I ever withheld from the KGB were the names of two agents whom I personally had known and handled and had a particular feeling for.

The use of the polygraph has done little more than create confusion, ambiguity and mistakes.