By the late '70s I had come to question the point of a great deal of what we were doing, in terms of the CIA's overall charter.

The national security state has many unfair and cruel weapons in its arsenal, but that of junk science is one which can be fought and perhaps defeated.

I could have stopped it after they paid me the $50,000. I wouldn't even have had to go on to do more than I already had: just the double agents' names that I gave.

The resistance of policy-makers to intelligence is not just founded on an ideological presupposition. They distrust intelligence sources and intelligence officials because they don't understand what the real problems are.

Perhaps my information hurt the Soviet Union more than it helped. I have no idea. It was not something I ever discussed with the KGB officers that I was dealing with.

My little scam in April '85 went like this: Give me $50,000; here's some names of some people we've recruited.

No one's interested really in knowing what policies or diplomatic initiatives or arms negotiations might have been compromised by me.