Kant does not regard freedom as an item of faith because it is too basic to our agency to be related to any end.

Kant thinks we can show that there is no contradiction in supposing we are free.

It is actually a nice question how far Descartes himself endorses the monological and metaphysically dualistic theory of mind associated with his name and his legacy in early modern philosophy. But Fichte does reject this tradition, by suggesting that an immaterial thinking substance is an incoherent notion, and a rational being whose rationality was not developed through communication with others is a transcendental impossibility.

The moral law is simply the way we think our own freedom as self-determination.

Fichte is a necessary step to both Hegel and Marx.

One rational standard of action is how well it promotes the end it seeks. Another standard is whether it aims at ends which are good. Both of these, but especially the former, depend on judgments of fact.

We can establish empirical criteria for free actions, and investigate human actions on the presupposition we are free.