Now the soul of man is divided into two parts, one of which has a rational principle in itself, and the other, not having a rational principle in itself, is able to obey such a principle. And we call a man in any way good because he has the virtues of these two parts.

Dignity does not consist in possessing honors, but in deserving them.

But what is happiness? If we consider what the function of man is, we find that happiness is a virtuous activity of the soul.

For well-being and health, again, the homestead should be airy in summer, and sunny in winter. A homestead possessing these qualities would be longer than it is deep; and its main front would face the south.

A friend is another I.

Of the irrational part of the soul again one division appears to be common to all living things, and of a vegetative nature.

Whereas the law is passionless, passion must ever sway the heart of man.