There was a process in place at that time - the Downing Street Declaration of December 1993 - which set out the terms and conditions under which people who had been involved in paramilitary activity could come into the political process.

It seemed to me that John [Taylor] had a good chance of becoming leader: and I was fairly comfortable with that. I respected his judgment. And I also thought to myself that - because I was able to get on with him - I could become his Chief Whip.

The dark shadow we seem to see in the distance is not really a mountain ahead, but the shadow of the mountain behind - a shadow from the past thrown forward into our future. It is a dark sludge of historical sectarianism. We can leave it behind us if we wish.

There was a process in place at that time - the Downing Street Declaration of December 1993 - which set out the terms and conditions under which people who had been involved in paramilitary activity could come into the political process.

I knew what I had to do as party leader had to be sensible and relate to the real situation we were in, rather than a situation you would like to have.

The Republican movement have not behaved properly over the years. They have not themselves implemented the Agreement. If they had implemented the Agreement then they would have disarmed completely in May 2000, that is what they undertook to do, that is what they failed to do.

We had a completely deniable exchange of papers - in the winter before the 1997 election - with [Tony] Blair, setting out what we thought were the realistic parameters for a solution: and we were getting reasonable responses back from him. That's what led to Blair's visit to Belfast on May 16, 1997 - two weeks after he became Prime Minister and his first official visit outside London.