We had a completely deniable exchange of papers - in the winter before the 1997 election - with [Tony] Blair, setting out what we thought were the realistic parameters for a solution: and we were getting reasonable responses back from him. That's what led to Blair's visit to Belfast on May 16, 1997 - two weeks after he became Prime Minister and his first official visit outside London.

I knew what I had to do as party leader had to be sensible and relate to the real situation we were in, rather than a situation you would like to have.

We had a completely deniable exchange of papers - in the winter before the 1997 election - with [Tony] Blair, setting out what we thought were the realistic parameters for a solution: and we were getting reasonable responses back from him. That's what led to Blair's visit to Belfast on May 16, 1997 - two weeks after he became Prime Minister and his first official visit outside London.

It wasn't too difficult to see that [Ian] Paisley would never do anything positive.

I was organizing a fringe meeting at the Conservative Party conference in October 1994 and I got a message that the Prime Minister would like a meeting. I went to the meeting. It was just me and John Major.What Major said to me was this: "If you were in my shoes, what would you do?". He wasn't asking me what a unionist should do, but what he should do. And I knew that I had to give him a sensible answer.

We had the IRA ceasefire in August 1994 and a lot of people assumed that a deal had been done - which wasn't right.

There was a process in place at that time - the Downing Street Declaration of December 1993 - which set out the terms and conditions under which people who had been involved in paramilitary activity could come into the political process.