I knew what I had to do as party leader had to be sensible and relate to the real situation we were in, rather than a situation you would like to have.

There was a process in place at that time - the Downing Street Declaration of December 1993 - which set out the terms and conditions under which people who had been involved in paramilitary activity could come into the political process.

Politics can be likened to driving at night over unfamiliar hills and mountains. Close attention must be paid to what the beam can reach and the next bend.

We had the IRA ceasefire in August 1994 and a lot of people assumed that a deal had been done - which wasn't right.

The dark shadow we seem to see in the distance is not really a mountain ahead, but the shadow of the mountain behind - a shadow from the past thrown forward into our future. It is a dark sludge of historical sectarianism. We can leave it behind us if we wish.

During the 1996 Forum election my election agent, John Dobson, told me that at some stage down the line we were going to have to talk to the IRA and that I was the man to do it. And my reaction was not printable!

It seemed to me that John [Taylor] had a good chance of becoming leader: and I was fairly comfortable with that. I respected his judgment. And I also thought to myself that - because I was able to get on with him - I could become his Chief Whip.