We would be in a nasty position indeed if empirical science were the only kind of science possible.

The ideal of a pure phenomenology will be perfected only by answering this question; pure phenomenology is to be separated sharply from psychology at large and, specifically, from the descriptive psychology of the phenomena of consciousness.

To begin with, we put the proposition: pure phenomenology is the science of pure consciousness.

Without troublesome work, no one can have any concrete, full idea of what pure mathematical research is like or of the profusion of insights that can be obtained from it.

We would be in a nasty position indeed if empirical science were the only kind of science possible.

I must achieve internal consistency.

Pure phenomenology claims to be the science of pure phenomena. This concept of the phenomenon, which was developed under various names as early as the eighteenth century without being clarified, is what we shall have to deal with first of all.