Compare the credit for a football touchdown, which might be shared by the receiver not only with the quarterback, but also with the linesmen who make crucial protective plays, etc. The success of the touchdown play depends on the receiver, it is true; but in a particular case it might depend far more on the work of others.

Success is better than failure; an attempt is a better attempt, it is better as an attempt, if competent than if incompetent; and it is better to succeed through competence - aptly - than through sheer luck.

In order to qualify as a judgment, an affirmation must aim at getting it right aptly, through competence, and not just through a lucky guess.

The concept of intuition is more often used in philosophical theorizing than is the concept of observation in scientific theorizing (proportionately). One reason is that there is (proportionately) more ostensible conflict of philosophical intuitions than there is ostensible conflict of scientific observations. So much for the use of a concept of intuition in philosophical theorizing.

Descartes's epistemology is a special case of Aristotle's virtue ethics.

Lowered reliability obviously yields a lesser competence. But lowered breadth does so as well.

Ultimately, my more significant agreement is with a virtue tradition that features Aristotle and Descartes.