The Chinese banking system is built on quicksand and that's the one thing a lot of people don't realize. [...] Everybody seems to think it is a free and clear open checkbook. It's not. [...] The banking system in China is extremely fragile.

What we define as a bubble is any kind of debt-fueled asset inflation where the cash flow generated by the asset itself - a rental property, office building, condo - does not cover the debt incurred to buy the asset. So you depend on a greater fool, if you will, to come in and buy at a higher price.

People who lose money always need someone to blame.

The U.S. healthcare system is probably the most interesting large group of companies that are heading for major problems that we've seen in a long, long time.

Bubbles are best identified by credit excesses, not valuation excesses. And there's no bigger credit excess than in China.

Dubai was a property bubble. Plain and simple. Go to Dubai and see what happened. It was... what I call it the 'Edifice complex' - it's just, we can grow by putting up lots and lots of buildings and trying to attract people to come here, stay here, and put up offices here and sooner or later, you put up too many.

What people don't realize is that China papered over its last two credit bubbles, those in 1999 and 2004. The banks were never bailed out - they just exchanged their bad loans for questionable bonds from quasi-state organizations.