The reason that no computer program can ever be a mind is simply that a computer program is only syntactical, and minds are more than syntactical. Minds are semantical, in the sense that they have more than a formal structure, they have a content.

Where conscious subjectivity is concerned, there is no distinction between the observation and the thing observed.

An utterance can have Intentionality, just as a belief has Intentionality, but whereas the Intentionality of the belief is intrinsic the Intentionality of the utterance is derived.

My car and my adding machine understand nothing: they are not in that line of business

The problem posed by indirect speech acts is the problem of how it is possible for the speaker to say one thing and mean that but also to mean something else.

If you can't say it clearly, you don't understand it yourself

I will argue that in the literal sense the programmed computer understands what the car and the adding machine understand, namely, exactly nothing.