It is convenient to distinguish the two kinds of experience which have thus been described, the experienc-ing and the experienc-ed, by technical words.

It is more difficult to designate this form of conation on its practical side by a satisfactory name.

An expectation is a future object, recognised as belonging to me.

It may be added, to prevent misunderstanding, that when I speak of contemplated objects in this last phrase as objects of contemplation, the act of contemplation itself is of course an enjoyment.

Mental life is indeed practical through and through. It begins in practice and it ends in practice.

Hence, in desiring, the more the enjoyment is delayed, the more fancy begins to weave about the object images of future fruition, and to clothe the desired object with properties calculated to inflame the impulse.

We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element.