When we come to images or memories or thoughts, speculation, while always closely related to practice, is more explicit, and it is in fact not immediately obvious that such processes can be described in any sense as practical.

The mental act of sensation which issues in reflex movement is so simple as to defy analysis.

It may be added, to prevent misunderstanding, that when I speak of contemplated objects in this last phrase as objects of contemplation, the act of contemplation itself is of course an enjoyment.

The thing of which the act of perception is the perception is experienced as something not mental.

Both expectations and memories are more than mere images founded on previous experience.

Thus the same object may supply a practical perception to one person and a speculative one to another, or the same person may perceive it partly practically and partly speculatively.

In the perception of a tree we can distinguish the act of experiencing, or perceiving, from the thing experienced, or perceived.