We have been working hard to think about what our combined needs are going to be in the way of intelligence capabilities, not today but 15 to 20 years in the future.

In other words, by finding the anomalous event, what you do is you get out ahead of activities.

It's easy to measure success by the number of dollars spent or by the number of programs initiated, without having too much regard for what was bought and how useful it was to the people who need it - the war fighter and the analyst.

And then fourth, we have that essential group of people who track programs and budgets to ensure that they align with the needs of preparation and warning, counterintelligence and support to the operational war fighter.

There is a reasonable concern that posting raw data can be misleading for those who are not trained in its use and who do not have the broader perspective within which to place a particular piece of data that is raw.

The users are not going to be in the position of accepting what's been collected; they're going to be in the position of being able to demand collection.

One is to ensure that the war fighters and the intelligence analysts get the information that they need when they need it, in a format that's useful to them.