So we have a group within the office that is devoted to support for the war fighter. That's, of necessity, an operational and tactical level of concern.

One is to ensure that the war fighters and the intelligence analysts get the information that they need when they need it, in a format that's useful to them.

It's easy to measure success by the number of dollars spent or by the number of programs initiated, without having too much regard for what was bought and how useful it was to the people who need it - the war fighter and the analyst.

The users are not going to be in the position of accepting what's been collected; they're going to be in the position of being able to demand collection.

In other words, by finding the anomalous event, what you do is you get out ahead of activities.

We have been working hard to think about what our combined needs are going to be in the way of intelligence capabilities, not today but 15 to 20 years in the future.

Our focus is on outputs rather than inputs.