The U.S. is, so far as I know, the only nation which places such extensive reliance on the polygraph. It has gotten us into a lot of trouble.

By the late '70s I had come to question the point of a great deal of what we were doing, in terms of the CIA's overall charter.

The betrayal of trust carries a heavy taboo.

No one's interested really in knowing what policies or diplomatic initiatives or arms negotiations might have been compromised by me.

I could have stopped it after they paid me the $50,000. I wouldn't even have had to go on to do more than I already had: just the double agents' names that I gave.

I said in court a long time ago that I didn't see that the Soviet Union was significantly helped by the information I gave them, nor that the United States was significantly harmed.

My little scam in April '85 went like this: Give me $50,000; here's some names of some people we've recruited.