Both Kant and Fichte thought of traditions of revealed religion as ways of symbolically (that is, with aesthetic emotional power) thinking about our moral condition. Both thought that religion would become more and not less powerful, emotionally and morally, if the claims of scriptures and religious teachings were taken symbolically rather than literally (whatever 'literally' might mean in the case of claims that are either nonsensical or outdated or historically unsupportable if taken as metaphysical or historical assertions).

It is probably not a good idea to ask someone to expound a position they do not accept and do not feel they even fully understand.

Kant is not saying - about freedom or any other subject - anything of the form: "Not-p but we must assume that p." That's close to self-contradictory, like Moore's paradox: "p, but I don't believe that p".

In fact people do not know enough about themselves and what is good for them to form a sufficiently definite conception of the general happiness (or whatever the end is) to establish definite rules for its pursuit.

There is a lot in Adam Smith that reflects the insights of Rousseau and anticipates those of Marx.

That Hegel's theory is derivative from Fichte's does not prevent it from being strikingly original and of independent value.

Clearly no working class movement ever came about that was able to do what Marx was hoping for.