A general in time of war is constantly bombarded by reports both true and false; by errors arising from fear or negligence or hastiness; by disobedience born of right or wrong interpretations, of ill will; of a proper or mistaken sense of duty; of laziness; or of exhaustion; and by accident that nobody could have foreseen. In short, he is exposed to countless impressions, most of them disturbing, few of them encouraging. ... If a man were to yield to these pressures, he would never complete an operation.

Knowing is different from doing and therefore theory must never be used as norms for a standard, but merely as aids to judgment.

Surprise becomes effective when we suddenly face the enemy at one point with far more troops than he expected. This type of numerical superiority is quite distinct from numerical superiority in general: it is the most powerful medium in the art of war.

Blind aggressiveness would destroy the attack itself, not the defense.

The only situation a commander can know fully is his own: his opponent's he can know only from unreliable intelligence.

Although our intellect always longs for clarity and certainty, our nature often finds uncertainty fascinating.

The backbone of surprise is fusing speed with secrecy.