We are now returning to the 18th century empirical approach with the new interest in the evolutionary basis of ethics, with 'experimental' moral philosophy and moral psychology. As a result, we understand better why moral formulas are experienced as ineluctable commands, even if there is no commander and even if the notion of an inescapable obligation is just superstition. So moral philosophy has made huge progress.

The (atomic) soul is mortal, and the best life is the one with the least pain and the most pleasure.

We have to gamble, and sometimes lose as George Ainslie argues; this keeps the appetite for life sharp.

Even if you just want to make a simple clothing item for yourself or go for a long hike in the forest - something we imagine requires absolutely no resources - you have to go to the store and buy a lot of stuff, and probably use a car.

I think we do have a better understanding now of how moral thought and discourse function.

Epicurus thought of justice as an agreement to prevent people harming and being harmed.

I don't see how being a faster runner, or a better mathematician makes you 'deserve' access to a better life, or more influence on policy, in the absence of a social decision to play that game in the way it's proposed to be organised for some set of benefits.