Descartes's epistemology is a special case of Aristotle's virtue ethics.

Ultimately, my more significant agreement is with a virtue tradition that features Aristotle and Descartes.

Flourishing is properly the main human end, and flourishing is activity of soul that succeeds in accord with virtue.

Given its more substantial aim, a judgment is apt only if its constitutive alethic affirmation is not only apt but aptly apt. The subject must attain aptly not only the truth of his affirmation but also its aptness. And that in turn requires not only the proper operation of one's perception, memory, inference, etc., but also that one deploy such competences through competent epistemic risk assessment.

It is possible to produce something that is grammatical either by chance or under the supervision of another. To be proficient in grammar, then, one must both produce what is grammatical and produce it grammatically, that is, in accord with knowledge of grammar in oneself.

If we have a better understanding of knowledge than we do of such justification or competence, then we can explain the latter through the former.

Philosophers do need to have intuitions of various specific sorts: ethical, metaphysical, etc., depending on their targeted subject matter. And they must make intuition reports, as they record the contents of their intuitions. But they need not go into whether an intuition has been enjoyed.