Descartes's epistemology is a special case of Aristotle's virtue ethics.

Any defense of common sense must allow that it is revisable.

The success of an archery shot may bring food to the hunter's starving family, or may constitute a horrible murder. But these outcomes are irrelevant to the assessment of that shot as a hunter-archery shot, as an attempt to hit prey without running excessive risk of failure.

Lowered reliability obviously yields a lesser competence. But lowered breadth does so as well.

We can pursue the Cartesian project without restricting ourselves to theology and a priori faculties. A better, broader perspective is properly sought if we pursue the project with reliance on science broadly and on our full span of epistemic competences, including the empirical as well as the a priori.

Philosophers need not much use the word 'intuition' or the concept of intuition, except when they happen to be working on the epistemology of the a priori.

Epistemic competence might be posterior to knowledge conceptually, however, while still prior metaphysically.