There is no one kind of thing that we 'perceive' but many different kinds, the number being reducible if at all by scientific investigation and not by philosophy: pens are in many ways though not in all ways unlike rainbows, which are in many ways though not in all ways unlike after-images, which in turn are in many ways but not in all ways unlike pictures on the cinema-screen--and so on.

Are cans constitutionally iffy? Whenever, that is, we say that we can do something, or could do something, or could have done something, is there an if in the offing--suppressed, it may be, but due nevertheless to appear when we set out our sentence in full or when we give an explanation of its meaning?

It should be quite clear, then, that there are no criteria to be laid down in general for distinguishing the real from the not real.

Going back into the history of a word, very often into Latin, we come back pretty commonly to pictures or models of how things happen or are done.

The theory of truth is a series of truisms.

A sentence is made up of words, a statement is made in words.... Statements are made, words or sentences are used.

Ordinary language embodies the metaphysics of the Stone Age.