The ascription of an unconscious intentional phenomenon to a system implies that the phenomenon is in principle accessible to consciousness.

It seems to me obvious that infants and many animals that do not in any ordinary sense have a language or perform speech acts nonetheless have Intentional states. Only someone in the grip of a philosophical theory would deny that small babies can literally be said to want milk and that dogs want to be let out or believe that their master is at the door.

The reason that no computer program can ever be a mind is simply that a computer program is only syntactical, and minds are more than syntactical. Minds are semantical, in the sense that they have more than a formal structure, they have a content.

We do not live in several different, or even two different, worlds, a mental world and a physical world, a scientific world and a world of common sense. Rather, there is just one world; it is the world we all live in, and we need to account for how we exist as part of it.

Where consciousness is concerned, the appearance is the reality.

Where conscious subjectivity is concerned, there is no distinction between the observation and the thing observed.

Dualism makes the problem insoluble; materialism denies the existence of any phenomenon to study, and hence of any problem.