But though cognition is not an element of mental action, nor even in any real sense of the word an aspect of it, the distinction of cognition and conation has if properly defined a definite value.

The mental act of sensation which issues in reflex movement is so simple as to defy analysis.

You can mark in desire the rising of the tide, as the appetite more and more invades the personality, appealing, as it does, not merely to the sensory side of the self, but to its ideal components as well.

We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element.

When we come to images or memories or thoughts, speculation, while always closely related to practice, is more explicit, and it is in fact not immediately obvious that such processes can be described in any sense as practical.

Curiosity begins as an act of tearing to pieces or analysis.

Both expectations and memories are more than mere images founded on previous experience.