But unfortunately Locke treated ideas of reflection as if they were another class of objects of contemplation beside ideas of sensation.

We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element.

It may be added, to prevent misunderstanding, that when I speak of contemplated objects in this last phrase as objects of contemplation, the act of contemplation itself is of course an enjoyment.

The sensory acts are accordingly distinguished by their objects.

Desire then is the invasion of the whole self by the wish, which, as it invades, sets going more and more of the psychical processes; but at the same time, so long as it remains desire, does not succeed in getting possession of the self.

Mental life is indeed practical through and through. It begins in practice and it ends in practice.

You can mark in desire the rising of the tide, as the appetite more and more invades the personality, appealing, as it does, not merely to the sensory side of the self, but to its ideal components as well.