But unfortunately Locke treated ideas of reflection as if they were another class of objects of contemplation beside ideas of sensation.

Thus the same object may supply a practical perception to one person and a speculative one to another, or the same person may perceive it partly practically and partly speculatively.

In the perception of a tree we can distinguish the act of experiencing, or perceiving, from the thing experienced, or perceived.

The sensory acts are accordingly distinguished by their objects.

We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element.

What is the meaning of the togetherness of the perceiving mind, in that peculiar modification of perceiving which makes it perceive not a star but a tree, and the tree itself, is a problem for philosophy

You can mark in desire the rising of the tide, as the appetite more and more invades the personality, appealing, as it does, not merely to the sensory side of the self, but to its ideal components as well.