What is the meaning of the togetherness of the perceiving mind, in that peculiar modification of perceiving which makes it perceive not a star but a tree, and the tree itself, is a problem for philosophy

Mental life is indeed practical through and through. It begins in practice and it ends in practice.

The mental act of sensation which issues in reflex movement is so simple as to defy analysis.

But unfortunately Locke treated ideas of reflection as if they were another class of objects of contemplation beside ideas of sensation.

In the perception of a tree we can distinguish the act of experiencing, or perceiving, from the thing experienced, or perceived.

Hence, in desiring, the more the enjoyment is delayed, the more fancy begins to weave about the object images of future fruition, and to clothe the desired object with properties calculated to inflame the impulse.

We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element.