In the perception of a tree we can distinguish the act of experiencing, or perceiving, from the thing experienced, or perceived.

Hence, in desiring, the more the enjoyment is delayed, the more fancy begins to weave about the object images of future fruition, and to clothe the desired object with properties calculated to inflame the impulse.

An expectation is a future object, recognised as belonging to me.

We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element.

The thing of which the act of perception is the perception is experienced as something not mental.

Desire then is the invasion of the whole self by the wish, which, as it invades, sets going more and more of the psychical processes; but at the same time, so long as it remains desire, does not succeed in getting possession of the self.

What is the meaning of the togetherness of the perceiving mind, in that peculiar modification of perceiving which makes it perceive not a star but a tree, and the tree itself, is a problem for philosophy