In the perception of a tree we can distinguish the act of experiencing, or perceiving, from the thing experienced, or perceived.

The sensory acts are accordingly distinguished by their objects.

In the perception of a tree we can distinguish the act of experiencing, or perceiving, from the thing experienced, or perceived.

For psychological purposes the most important differences in conation are those in virtue of which the object is revealed as sensed or perceived or imaged or remembered or thought.

What is the meaning of the togetherness of the perceiving mind, in that peculiar modification of perceiving which makes it perceive not a star but a tree, and the tree itself, is a problem for philosophy

It is more difficult to designate this form of conation on its practical side by a satisfactory name.

An object is not first imagined or thought about and then expected or willed, but in being actively expected it is imagined as future and in being willed it is thought.