The sensory acts are accordingly distinguished by their objects.

Hence, in desiring, the more the enjoyment is delayed, the more fancy begins to weave about the object images of future fruition, and to clothe the desired object with properties calculated to inflame the impulse.

It is more difficult to designate this form of conation on its practical side by a satisfactory name.

We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element.

Curiosity begins as an act of tearing to pieces or analysis.

Thus the same object may supply a practical perception to one person and a speculative one to another, or the same person may perceive it partly practically and partly speculatively.

What is the meaning of the togetherness of the perceiving mind, in that peculiar modification of perceiving which makes it perceive not a star but a tree, and the tree itself, is a problem for philosophy