The mental act of sensation which issues in reflex movement is so simple as to defy analysis.

We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element.

It is more difficult to designate this form of conation on its practical side by a satisfactory name.

It is convenient to distinguish the two kinds of experience which have thus been described, the experienc-ing and the experienc-ed, by technical words.

When we come to images or memories or thoughts, speculation, while always closely related to practice, is more explicit, and it is in fact not immediately obvious that such processes can be described in any sense as practical.

It may be added, to prevent misunderstanding, that when I speak of contemplated objects in this last phrase as objects of contemplation, the act of contemplation itself is of course an enjoyment.

The perceptive act is a reaction of the mind upon the object of which it is the perception.