The mental act of sensation which issues in reflex movement is so simple as to defy analysis.

It may be added, to prevent misunderstanding, that when I speak of contemplated objects in this last phrase as objects of contemplation, the act of contemplation itself is of course an enjoyment.

We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element.

The perceptive act is a reaction of the mind upon the object of which it is the perception.

What is the meaning of the togetherness of the perceiving mind, in that peculiar modification of perceiving which makes it perceive not a star but a tree, and the tree itself, is a problem for philosophy

The sensory acts are accordingly distinguished by their objects.

But though cognition is not an element of mental action, nor even in any real sense of the word an aspect of it, the distinction of cognition and conation has if properly defined a definite value.