The mental act of sensation which issues in reflex movement is so simple as to defy analysis.

We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element.

What is the meaning of the togetherness of the perceiving mind, in that peculiar modification of perceiving which makes it perceive not a star but a tree, and the tree itself, is a problem for philosophy

It may be added, to prevent misunderstanding, that when I speak of contemplated objects in this last phrase as objects of contemplation, the act of contemplation itself is of course an enjoyment.

Mental life is indeed practical through and through. It begins in practice and it ends in practice.

The thing of which the act of perception is the perception is experienced as something not mental.

An object is not first imagined or thought about and then expected or willed, but in being actively expected it is imagined as future and in being willed it is thought.