It would be nice, wouldn't it? if we could get comfortable about the problem of freedom. Kant thinks that we can't.

Not only our moral life, but even our use of theoretical reason - on which we rely in rationally inquiring into nature - presupposes that we are free.

My own view is that Kant's conception of the duality of the good (morality and happiness, the good of our person and the good of our state or condition) is a distinctively modern view.

Sometimes when a philosopher's views are widely rejected by the world, the fault is not with the philosopher but with the world.

Kant regards the universalizability test for maxims as focused on a very special sort of situation: one where the agent is tempted to make an exception to a recognized duty out of self-preference. The universalizability test is supposed help the agent to see, in a particular case of moral judgment, that self-preference is not a satisfactory reason for exempting yourself from a duty you recognize. Kant thinks, as a matter of human nature, that this situation arises often enough and that we need a canon of judgment to guard against it.

That Hegel's theory is derivative from Fichte's does not prevent it from being strikingly original and of independent value.

Fichte is a necessary step to both Hegel and Marx.