Lowered reliability obviously yields a lesser competence. But lowered breadth does so as well.

When there are conflicts of observation, when experiments cannot be replicated, scientists may then retreat to a study of the various specific observations so as to explain the conflict, in the course of which they would make use of the concept of observation, or of some specification of that concept.

Flourishing is properly the main human end, and flourishing is activity of soul that succeeds in accord with virtue.

A successful account enables us to understand human knowledge in general.

Epistemic competence might be posterior to knowledge conceptually, however, while still prior metaphysically.

Arguably, if you view a real barn in bright sunlight and close by, while fully alert and otherwise in good shape, then you do know whether or not you see a barn. You have "animal" knowledge, says my virtue theory, through the first-order aptness of your judgment.

We must distinguish judging from guessing.