It is more difficult to designate this form of conation on its practical side by a satisfactory name.

What is the meaning of the togetherness of the perceiving mind, in that peculiar modification of perceiving which makes it perceive not a star but a tree, and the tree itself, is a problem for philosophy

We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element.

Mental life is indeed practical through and through. It begins in practice and it ends in practice.

Desire then is the invasion of the whole self by the wish, which, as it invades, sets going more and more of the psychical processes; but at the same time, so long as it remains desire, does not succeed in getting possession of the self.

An object is not first imagined or thought about and then expected or willed, but in being actively expected it is imagined as future and in being willed it is thought.

The sensory acts are accordingly distinguished by their objects.