Mental life is indeed practical through and through. It begins in practice and it ends in practice.

We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element.

It is more difficult to designate this form of conation on its practical side by a satisfactory name.

When we come to images or memories or thoughts, speculation, while always closely related to practice, is more explicit, and it is in fact not immediately obvious that such processes can be described in any sense as practical.

In the perception of a tree we can distinguish the act of experiencing, or perceiving, from the thing experienced, or perceived.

Thus the same object may supply a practical perception to one person and a speculative one to another, or the same person may perceive it partly practically and partly speculatively.

An object is not first imagined or thought about and then expected or willed, but in being actively expected it is imagined as future and in being willed it is thought.