Mental life is indeed practical through and through. It begins in practice and it ends in practice.

But though cognition is not an element of mental action, nor even in any real sense of the word an aspect of it, the distinction of cognition and conation has if properly defined a definite value.

But unfortunately Locke treated ideas of reflection as if they were another class of objects of contemplation beside ideas of sensation.

You can mark in desire the rising of the tide, as the appetite more and more invades the personality, appealing, as it does, not merely to the sensory side of the self, but to its ideal components as well.

It is more difficult to designate this form of conation on its practical side by a satisfactory name.

The sensory acts are accordingly distinguished by their objects.

Psychology is the science of the act of experiencing, and deals with the whole system of such acts as they make up mental life.