We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element.

Mental life is indeed practical through and through. It begins in practice and it ends in practice.

In the perception of a tree we can distinguish the act of experiencing, or perceiving, from the thing experienced, or perceived.

It is convenient to distinguish the two kinds of experience which have thus been described, the experienc-ing and the experienc-ed, by technical words.

The interval between a cold expectation and a warm desire may be filled by expectations of varying degrees of warmth or by desires of varying degrees of coldness.

For psychological purposes the most important differences in conation are those in virtue of which the object is revealed as sensed or perceived or imaged or remembered or thought.

Hence, in desiring, the more the enjoyment is delayed, the more fancy begins to weave about the object images of future fruition, and to clothe the desired object with properties calculated to inflame the impulse.