We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element.

Hence, in desiring, the more the enjoyment is delayed, the more fancy begins to weave about the object images of future fruition, and to clothe the desired object with properties calculated to inflame the impulse.

The thing of which the act of perception is the perception is experienced as something not mental.

An expectation is a future object, recognised as belonging to me.

It is more difficult to designate this form of conation on its practical side by a satisfactory name.

But though cognition is not an element of mental action, nor even in any real sense of the word an aspect of it, the distinction of cognition and conation has if properly defined a definite value.

An object is not first imagined or thought about and then expected or willed, but in being actively expected it is imagined as future and in being willed it is thought.