We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element.

It may be added, to prevent misunderstanding, that when I speak of contemplated objects in this last phrase as objects of contemplation, the act of contemplation itself is of course an enjoyment.

An object is not first imagined or thought about and then expected or willed, but in being actively expected it is imagined as future and in being willed it is thought.

It is more difficult to designate this form of conation on its practical side by a satisfactory name.

When we come to images or memories or thoughts, speculation, while always closely related to practice, is more explicit, and it is in fact not immediately obvious that such processes can be described in any sense as practical.

The perceptive act is a reaction of the mind upon the object of which it is the perception.

But unfortunately Locke treated ideas of reflection as if they were another class of objects of contemplation beside ideas of sensation.