We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element.

You can mark in desire the rising of the tide, as the appetite more and more invades the personality, appealing, as it does, not merely to the sensory side of the self, but to its ideal components as well.

The thing of which the act of perception is the perception is experienced as something not mental.

When we come to images or memories or thoughts, speculation, while always closely related to practice, is more explicit, and it is in fact not immediately obvious that such processes can be described in any sense as practical.

We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element.

Curiosity begins as an act of tearing to pieces or analysis.

Thus the same object may supply a practical perception to one person and a speculative one to another, or the same person may perceive it partly practically and partly speculatively.