The interval between a cold expectation and a warm desire may be filled by expectations of varying degrees of warmth or by desires of varying degrees of coldness.

We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element.

In the perception of a tree we can distinguish the act of experiencing, or perceiving, from the thing experienced, or perceived.

An object is not first imagined or thought about and then expected or willed, but in being actively expected it is imagined as future and in being willed it is thought.

Such being the nature of mental life, the business of psychology is primarily to describe in detail the various forms which attention or conation assumes upon the different levels of that life.

The thing of which the act of perception is the perception is experienced as something not mental.

It is convenient to distinguish the two kinds of experience which have thus been described, the experienc-ing and the experienc-ed, by technical words.