Thus the same object may supply a practical perception to one person and a speculative one to another, or the same person may perceive it partly practically and partly speculatively.

We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element.

... when demand is being destroyed by expensive oil just as expensive oil is incentivising increased production - it should come as no surprise that at some point the markets would react.

When we come to images or memories or thoughts, speculation, while always closely related to practice, is more explicit, and it is in fact not immediately obvious that such processes can be described in any sense as practical.

Such being the nature of mental life, the business of psychology is primarily to describe in detail the various forms which attention or conation assumes upon the different levels of that life.

In the perception of a tree we can distinguish the act of experiencing, or perceiving, from the thing experienced, or perceived.

Curiosity begins as an act of tearing to pieces or analysis.