Thus the same object may supply a practical perception to one person and a speculative one to another, or the same person may perceive it partly practically and partly speculatively.

It is convenient to distinguish the two kinds of experience which have thus been described, the experienc-ing and the experienc-ed, by technical words.

An expectation is a future object, recognised as belonging to me.

The interval between a cold expectation and a warm desire may be filled by expectations of varying degrees of warmth or by desires of varying degrees of coldness.

It is more difficult to designate this form of conation on its practical side by a satisfactory name.

In the perception of a tree we can distinguish the act of experiencing, or perceiving, from the thing experienced, or perceived.

But though cognition is not an element of mental action, nor even in any real sense of the word an aspect of it, the distinction of cognition and conation has if properly defined a definite value.